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A Framework for Assessing














Organizations are faced with different types of information security threats and implement several security technologies to
mitigate these security threats.  The security technologies vary in their ability to deal with different types of security threats
and hence, organizations usually implement a portfolio of security technologies. A key challenge for organizations is to
evaluate and determine the value of the counter-measures in the context of these portfolios. This research develops a
framework for systematically evaluating the value of portfolios of different types of security investments given the threats and
business environment faced by an organization.  The proposed framework builds on the theory of financial asset valuation
and develops a simulation model that considers a variety of factors such as type of threat, frequency of arrival, possible
damage, and recovery time from damage.
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INTRODUCTION
Organizations are faced with different types of information security threats.  Virus attacks and denial of service attacks alone
resulted in about $81 million in losses in 2004 for organizations, according to a survey by CSI/FBI (Gordon et.al., 2004).  In
response to these threats and attacks, organizations continue to implement several counter-measures, including anti-virus
software, firewalls, intrusion detection and/or prevention, and encryption (of files and of data in transit).  A key challenge for
organizations is to evaluate and determine the economic consequences of the security threats and counter-measures. Most
organizations implement a portfolio of the security technologies and there is relatively little research on the economic
benefits of portfolios of security technologies, which recognizes the differences and interrelationships between benefits
provided by different technologies in the portfolio. Our research develops a framework for systematically evaluating the
value of portfolios of different types of security investments. The framework builds on the theory of financial asset valuation
and develops a simulation model that considers a variety of factors such as type of threat, frequency of arrival, possible
damage, and recovery time from damage.
OVERVIEW OF IS SECURITY THREATS AND TECHNOLOGIES
A security threat refers to the attempt made to compromise an information system to exploit the systems vulnerability. An
attack is the materialization of the threat or the actual exploitation of an IS security vulnerability1. A CSI/FBI study has
identified different types of attacks on organizational information systems, including virus and worms, insider abuse of
network access, laptop theft, denial of service, system penetration, unauthorized access of information system resources or
data, and theft of proprietary information (Gordon et.al., 2004). Another study found that theft of proprietary/confidential
information, virus attacks, and denial of service are the three most important security threats to information systems
(Farahmand et al., 2003). Table 1 summarizes the impact of these attacks on organizations. The loss suffered by a firm
related to the security attack can be in the form of loss of confidential information, faulty decisions based on altered data, or
loss of business from denial of service (Gordon and Loeb, 2002).
1 Even though a threat is, strictly speaking, different from an attack, we have used the terms interchangeably in our paper.
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Table 1.  Major types of security attacks and their organizational impacts
There are many security technologies used by organizations as counter-measures to address the IS security threats.  The
security technologies are constantly evolving in response to the ever-changing nature of the threats and the novel methods
adopted by the threat agents.  However, based on studies by several IS security researchers and organizations such as CERT
and CSI, we have identified the major IS security technologies (ISST) and their characteristics in Table 2.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Our research builds on two streams of literature in the IS area.  The first stream relates to the value of IT investments. Studies
that have analyzed the business value of IT in organizational contexts have emphasized that the extent of IT use and the
context in which IT is used are major determinants of IT value (Mukhopdhyay Kekre and Sundar, 1995, Fan, Stalhert and
Whinston 2000, Devaraj and Kohli, 2003, Kumar 2004). Hence it is important to consider the context in which ISST are used
in order to determine their value.
The second stream relates to information security investments, including economic models.  Gordon and Loeb (2002)
consider an economic model that examines how the vulnerability of information and the potential loss from such
vulnerability affects the optimal resources to invest in security.  A economic model of intrusion detection systems by
Cavusoglu et. al., (2005) shows that with optimally configured IDS, the value from such a system is strictly non-negative and
this configuration always deters hackers.  The economic views also recognize that when using security technologies,
organizations may have to consider trade-offs and conflicts among their security goals and it is necessary to evaluate any
security portfolio in terms of the corporate IS security priorities (Gordon and Loeb, 2002).  Our model specifically considers
a portfolio of security investments and the effectiveness of different portfolios of IS security technologies.  We describe our
model in the next section.
UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENT TYPES OF ISST AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO BUSINESS VALUE
Consider a hypothetical scenario where an organization has no ISST. We use this scenario as a base case to illustrate the
value added by different types of ISST. The “value” of the organization’s IT infrastructure and applications (ITIA) can be
denoted by the NPV generated by IT applications that the infrastructure supports. The value of ITIA is affected not only by
the type of ISST, but also by the manner in which it is used. For example, an infrastructure supporting e-commerce sales
transactions on the Web is more valuable when the number of users is high. The value of the organization’s infrastructure and
applications varies over time, due to variations in factors such as number of users and number of transactions using it. Hence
we can model IT infrastructure and applications value IV as a function of usage (the number of transactions as well as the
value of each transaction).
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Table 2. Major countermeasures to combat security threats
In general, IV can be modeled as a time-dependent variable which follows a certain pattern, i.e. a stochastic process (Kumar,
2004). Let IV t be the NPV of the infrastructure and applications at time t. IV t  varies  over  time due  to  changes  in  the
usage of applications supported, addition of new applications, environmental factors such as the economy and competition,
addition of new applications, and other factors.
Following Kumar (2004), the change in IV t  can be considered as being made up of three types of changes.  Each of these
changes can be positive or negative. The first type of change, termed the drift in value is a small change in value that could
accumulate over time to form a larger change in value.  An example of such a change would be an increase in rate of usage
of an e-commerce site. The second type of change, termed noise, is a “small instantaneous perturbation in value that does
not exhibit a long-term pattern”.  An example of such a change would be random daily fluctuations in usage. As in the case
 3296
Kumar et al.              A Framework for Assessing IT Security Investment Portfolios
Proceedings of the Twelfth Americas Conference on IS, Acapulco, Mexico August 04th-06th 2006
of stock prices (Press, 1969), the Weiner Stochastic Process is used to model the short-term perturbations in IV t . The third
type of change, termed jump is  a  “sudden, relatively large change in value.”   An  example  of  such  a  change  would  be  a
sudden spike in number of transactions during the closing of an auction e-commerce site, or due to the addition of a new type
of revenue earning application on the web site.  It is important to realize that these three parameters could be positive or
negative.  For example, certain applications could have a negative trend in usage or a software glitch could result in a
negative jump. Figure 1 illustrates the variation of IV t  as a function of these three types of changes.
Figure 1.  Components of changes in IV t
Arrival of jump events can be modeled to follow Poisson process )(tAk with arrival rate kλ  where k denotes the
type  of  jump.  For  any jump event  of  type k, there will be costs associated with responding to the event ( kc ) and benefits
resulting from responding to the event ( kb ). The net effect of these costs and benefits ( ka ) is a positive or negative jump in
IV t  and may be modeled to follow a lognormal distribution for each jump event k.
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Table 3.  Illustrative events affecting value of an IT infrastructure
It  is  important  to  note  that  in  Figure  2,  we  have  assumed  that  the  effect  of  ISST  is  to  reduce  the  magnitude  of
negative jumps.  In general ISST can enhance infrastructure value in one or more of the following ways:
(i) By decreasing jump sizes for negative events;
(ii) By decreasing the arrival rate of negative events (Figure 3);
(iii) By reducing the time to recover (or by increasing the recovery rate) from negative events (Figure 4); and
(iv) By providing early warning of possible security threats and thus, increasing the time to react to security threats.
Table 3 illustrates some events that may occur as well as the associated costs and benefits. Initially, it is assumed that the
infrastructure includes a basic ISST portfolio (BISST). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the variation of IV t  resulting from the
events described in Table 3 for two ISST portfolios: a basic portfolio (BISST), and  an advanced  portfolio (AISST).  ISST is
assumed to have no effect on installation of new application and integration of critical application.  However, for the security-
related events, ISST reduces the magnitude of negative jumps.  Thus the value added by investing in AISST instead of BISST
is the difference in areas between the two curves (AISST, and BISST) for some planning horizon T.
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Figure 2. Increased value due to an AISST that reduces the magnitude of negative jump events compared to a BISST
Figure 3.  Increased value due to an AISST that reduces the arrival rate of negative events compared to a BISST
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Figure 4. Increased value due to an AISST that increases the recovery rate
and magnitude of recovery from negative events compared to a BISST
Having time to react to a security attack is very useful for organizations as it can help in preparing and prioritizing the
security defenses.  These early warnings can come from the ISST (for e.g., an IDS warning) or from the attack and response
timeline of three types of technologies – technologies that aid in detecting attack (e.g. intrusion detection systems),
technologies that aid in detecting and recovering from an attack (e.g. anti-virus systems), and technologies that are only used
for recovery once an attack has happened (e.g. back-up and recovery systems).  We can therefore envisage the timeline from
the occurrence of an attempted attack to the time the system is fully recovered as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5.  Timeline of security attack and ISST response
Each type of ISST can have different types of impact on the Attack-Recovery timeline.  Table 4 below illustrates the types of
effects that common types of ISST can have. An  denotes a positive effect, and a  denotes a negative effect on each of the
parameters in the column headings.
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Table 4.  Illustration of the different effects of ISST
SIMULATION MODEL
Because of the interactions and interdependences between threats, countermeasures, and other operating environments, which
analytical models cannot fully address, a simulation model has been developed. The simulation model addresses four types of
effects (See Table 4) associated with different business environments, combinations of security threats, and ISST portfolios.
We use two types of parameters in our simulation. The environmental parameters include those associated with the business
environments and threats as listed in Table 5. For example, lifetime of ISST (T), drift rate (α ), short-term noise representing
volatility of IT infrastructure value ( tdz ), arrival rates of jumps ( kλ ), and means and variances of jump magnitudes ( ta ) are
considered environmental parameters.  The other type of parameters is related with effects of threats: frequency of threat
arrival ( jλ ), amount of damage ( jθ ), time required to recover from damage j ( jτ ), and amount of post-recovery damage
( jρ ). The values of these parameters are not independent of business environments and thus should be considered
accordingly. For this reason, we use beta distribution for post-recovery damage ( jρ ) in order to incorporate IT managers’
insights and experiences in their business environment. The time required to recover from damage is assumed to follow
exponential distribution, which is a special case of Erlang distribution widely used for service time in queuing systems.
In addition to the environmental parameters, the simulation requires parameters associated with countermeasures as well for
evaluation of ISST portfolios. These parameters mostly represent the effectiveness of countermeasures on expected damage,
recovery time, and recovery magnitude. Since the effectiveness of counter-measures is also experiential, we assume that these
parameters follow beta distribution as well.   The simulation parameters and their distributions are summarized in Table 5.
An object oriented programming language Java was used in order to build a model such that events such as jumps, damages,
and recoveries are treated as objects with properties such as type, magnitude, arrival time, and the like. Although the
conceptual model above illustrates various events (arrival, detection, and prevention of threats; and arrival and recovery of
damages),  the  events  considered  in  the  simulation  are  arrivals  of  damages  resulting  from  arrivals  of  threats  and
countermeasures’ responses. From the assumption that arrival process of threats is a Poisson process with jλ , we can derive
that a successful threats that are not prevented by counter-measures follow a Poisson process with ( )j j ijpλ ∏ .
Furthermore, arrivals of damages caused by successful threats follow the same Poisson process with ( )j j ijpλ ∏  because
the departure process of M/G/1 queuing system is also a Poisson process, a property known as PASTA (Poisson Arrivals See
Time Average) (Wolff 1982). Therefore, our simulation model does not take into account detection and response activities by
countermeasures during the time between the arrival of a threat and its damage.
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Using common random numbers (Law and Kelton 1991), each ISST portfolio is subjected to the same pseudo-random
conditions in terms of threat arrivals. This approach results in smaller variance and allows fewer observations for statistical
significance tests such as t-test or analysis of variance.
CONCLUSION AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATION
Simulation results illustrate the relationships between an organization’s business environment, the threat environment in
which it operates and characteristics of its ISST. These results and related managerial and research implications will be
presented at the conference.
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Table 5.  Simulation parameters and distributions used.
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